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I. Introduction
In the late 1990s American equity markets surged to new heights.
Investors, enjoying an unprecedented period of economic growth, flooded the
markets with capital. However, this dream would quickly turn into a
nightmare. In a matter of months many individual investors found their
portfolios and retirement accounts decimated as the market collapsed.
Dismayed investors lost trillions of dollars of net worth, seemingly overnight.
This dismay turned quickly to anger as the deceptions of company
executives and their advisors proved to be the root of the market collapse. An
overwhelming public outcry for reform, or vengeance, arose from the ashes of
these scandals. Congress reacted swiftly, instituting sweeping corporate
reforms, drastically changing the corporate regulatory environment with the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.1
Critics quickly denounced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as "a nightmare for
company executives," truly "a telling example of the law of unintended
consequences.'2  Immediately commentators recommended repealing or
modifying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Critics have since focused their attacks
upon Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Section 404), the section which
requires reports on a company's internal controls by management and their
external auditors.3 However, these critics still call for relief from this
misunderstood and much maligned reform.
This Note argues that while Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
without the proper study and contemplation typically given to such sweeping
legislation, current efforts to exempt smaller companies from Section 404 are
similarly misguided. Instead, this Note proposes a staggered implementation
process for smaller companies that have yet to comply with Section 404. In
addition, this proposal provides temporary relief from the onerous requirement
of auditing internal controls to smaller companies already in compliance with
Section 404. The "take it slow" approach of this proposal would ease the
burdens of compliance for companies, while providing the necessary protection
to investors. This slower approach would also allow regulators and companies
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 16 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinafter
Sarbanes-Oxley Act].
2. Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 Hous. L.
REv. 1, 49 (2003).
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404.
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to understand both the drawbacks and benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
better. Only when these parties fully understand all of the ramifications of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act can constructive dialogue about reform and relief begin.
Part II of this Note examines the factors in the equity markets that led to
the broad public support for regulatory action and briefly looks at the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. Part III highlights the unexpected negative effects arising from
implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and briefly describes the actions the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) took to address the small business
community's concerns about these negative effects. Part IV details the issues
the small business community utilizes in arguing for relief from Section 404
and examines recent evidence suggesting that complying with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act yields unexpected benefits. This recent evidence shows that the
issues presented by the small business community are not as significant as
many believe. This Note then provides a specific staggered approach to
mandating compliance with Section 404, which balances the concerns and
needs of smaller public companies and the public.
I. The Background of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Understanding Congress's motivation for passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
in mere months requires a clear picture of the business environment near the
turn of the century. This Part will explain how a handful of scandals could
adversely affect such a large portion of the American population. This
widespread harm provided Congress with sufficient political capital to allow
quick passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. With such limited time to react, the
interested parties provided little input in shaping the legislation. This hasty
action by Congress provoked an equally hasty, widespread condemnation by
the business community.
A. The Stock Market Bubbles and Bursts
A variety of factors contributed to the increasing number of individual
investors in the stock market during the two decades before the scandals that
changed the regulatory world of public companies. Many investors, lured by
visions of wealth, chased a skyrocketing bull market, as they salivated over a
Dow Jones industrial average that exploded from a 1982 low of less than 8004
4. See Arthur M. Louis, Individual Investors Gaining Status, S.F. CHRoN., Dec. 28,
1999, at DI (discussing the fundamental reasons for the increased "flow of individuals into
stocks... since the early 1980s").
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to almost 12,000 in early 2000.5 In addition to the willing investor, corporate
cost-cutting introduced many Americans to the stock market as defined-
contribution pension plans, such as 401(k)s and Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs), replaced their traditional defined-benefit pension plans.6 The
rapid development of technology led to the proliferation of discount brokers,
who provided ordinary Americans with the power to research, buy, and sell
stock with the click of a button. As a result of these factors, the percentage of
Americans invested in the stock market mushroomed during the 1980s and
1990s from twenty percent to approximately fifty percent of all households by
2002.'
While the profile of the average investor was changing, the equity markets
were transforming. During the 1990s, the longest economic boom in U.S.
history began,8 fueled by unprecedented development of technology and growth
of the telecommunications industry.9 As a result, countless "dot com"
companies were appearing on major exchanges on a seemingly daily basis, 10
while typically steady telecom stocks experienced surges in their share prices.1
However, these "new economy" companies had a corporate structure that
5. Dow Jones & Co., Dow Jones Industrials History 2000-2009, http://www.
djindexes.com/mdsidxlindex.cfm?event=-showAverages (last visited Aug. 17,2006) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. See Louis, supra note 4, at DI (stating that "the great corporate cost cutting movement
of recent decades has revolutionized pensions"). A defined-benefit pension is a pension plan
that guarantees the participant a specific, or defined, annual benefit upon retirement. Id. A
defined-contribution plan guarantees the participant a defined annual contribution. However,
the benefit realized by the participant depends upon the performance of their investment
choices. Id. Companies found the risk and expense of maintaining defined-benefit plans too
great and have shifted that burden to their employees. Id.
7. See Liz Marlantes, Stock Slide Dons New Meaning, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
July 15, 2002, at 1 (discussing the political ramifications of the recent increase in public
ownership of stock). A 2002 poll found that forty percent of Americans had at least $10,000
invested in the stock market. Id.
8. See Dow Jones & Co., supra note 5, at 1990-99 (showing the performance of the
Dow Jones Industrial Average in relation to historic world events).
9. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (andIt Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915,923 (2003) (discussing the "economic
expansion and technological innovation" of the 1990s).
10. See id. (discussing the large number of companies eager to take advantage of a market
flush with capital); see also Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Is Sufferingfrom Nonbenign Neglect, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 2002, at Cl (examining the heavy burden the increased number of public
companies placed on the SEC). According to an investigation by the General Accounting
Office, the number of corporate filings received by the SEC increased from 61,925 in 1991 to
98,745 in 2000, a 59% increase. Id.
11. See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 14-15 (discussing the rise of the telecommunications
industry during the late 1990s).
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differed greatly from traditional companies and that investors understood
poorly.12 "Dot com" companies began to experience phenomenal success in the
equity markets, not as a result of concrete results, but based on rumor,
speculation, and market momentum.' 3  While the rapid growth of the
telecommunications industry is likely a product of the same "irrational
exuberance,"'14 it fell victim to the more traditional economic concept of supply
and demand.15 The mantra for these telecom and "dot com" companies appears
to have been "spend your way to success."'16 This approach was sound while
investors poured capital into the markets, 17 but in 2000, as profits failed to
materialize quarter after quarter, the cash flow began to dry up.'8
By the spring of 2000, the general investing public recognized that the
market was severely overvalued. A massive sell off ensued as investors tried to
withdraw before the bubble burst, causing the depression of every major
American market.' 9 Over the next year and a half, the market began to clean
house with most nonviable "dot coms" quietly exiting the marketplace 20 and the
12. See Cunningham, supra note 9, at 923 (discussing the unconventional business
models used by most "dot corns"); see also J. William Gurley, In This Wild Market, Startups
Face a Very Tough Call, FORTUNE, Apr. 13, 1998, at 152 (discussing the irrational market
response to internet related company actions).
13. See Louis, supra note 4, at Dl (discussing the speculative nature of the stock market
in prosperous economic times); see also Gurley, supra note 12 (explaining how surges in an
internet related company's stock price were typically the result of speculation). To highlight
this point, consider "dot corn" darling Yahoo. At the end of 1999, Yahoo's market
capitalization was roughly equal to that of Disney, General Motors, and Johnson & Johnson
combined. Meanwhile, the three traditional companies had net income of approximately 180
times that of Yahoo's. Id.
14. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 13
15. Id. at 14-15. In the late 1990s, the telecommunications industry began to lay millions
of miles of fiber optic cable to be prepared to meet tremendous demand for electronic
communication. Id. at 14. However, the industry estimates that Internet traffic was to
experience annual growth of more than 1000% failed to materialize. Id. at 14-15. This fanciful
period of expansion never occurred, as actual growth was approximately ten percent of industry
estimates. Id. at 14. This resulted in an excessive supply of transmission capabilities which
caused bandwidth prices to drop an average of sixty-five percent a year. Id. at 15. Couple this
excessive transmission capability with rapidly improving transmission technology, and the
overcapacity issues become exponentially worse. Id.
16. Gurley, supra note 12, at 152 (discussing the aggressive spending used by companies
to seize market share).
17. Id.
18. See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 14-15 (discussing the rapid decline of the "dot corn"
and telecommunications industries).
19. See Cunningham, supra note 9, at 923-24 (recounting the events leading to the down
turn of the markets prior to 2002).
20. See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing the end of the "dot corn" boom).
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more stalwart telecom companies tightening their belts.2  The markets seemed
to be heading in the right direction, but the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, brought new uncertainties to the political and economic landscape.22 As
the country was attempting to cope with this tragedy, few were aware that one
more storm was about to be unleashed on the economy.
In October of 2001, Enron began its spectacular fall 23 from a "darling on
Wall Street"24 to the second largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, two short
months later.25 As Enron's accounting irregularities came to light, investors
(and the public) initially viewed the case as a result of the actions of a few
unscrupulous executives at Enron and Arthur Anderson, not as a sign of a
broken regulatory system.26 The murmurs of disgust would turn to cries for
reform over the next eight months as allegations of fraud surfaced in the wake
of a handful of bankruptcies at major companies, including WorldCom, Global
21. See id. at 16-17 (noting that over 500,000 telecom workers were laid off by early
2001).
22. See Cunningham, supra note 9, at 923-24 (discussing the events leading to the down
turn of the markets prior to 2002). The New York Stock Exchange closed for a week following
the attacks as the country attempted to process what had occurred. Id. When trading resumed,
the markets responded strongly, a seemingly patriotic response to the acts of terrorism on
American soil. Id. However, even the patriotic fervor that gripped the nation could not settle
the anxiety and uncertainty resulting from that day and the resulting war on terror. Id. Within
weeks a sell-off began and progressed steadily into the following year. Id.
23. See Floyd Norris, Where Did the Value Go at Enron?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, at
C l (noting the rapidly declining stock price of Enron). On October 16, 2001, Enron revealed a
$1.2 billion reduction in shareholders' equity in their quarterly earnings statements. Id.
Enron's share price plummeted forty percent in the week following this release. Id. This
plummet proved to be the beginning of the end of Enron's meteoric rise to fame. Id.
24. Julia King & Gary H. Anthers, Juiced, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 20, 2000, at 44
(discussing how Enron's use of internet technology transformed the company from an Old
Economy company to a "New Economy pioneer"); see also David Ivanovich, Everybody Knows
Enron 's Name, HOUSTON CHRoN., Oct. 21,2002, at AI (noting that "Fortune magazine named
Enron the nation's most innovative company five years running and... ranked Enron among its
'10 Stocks to Last the Decade"').
25. A bankruptcy is measured by the pre-bankruptcy assets of a company. When Enron
filed bankruptcy on December 2, 2001, its total pre-bankruptcy assets were $63.4 billion. Enron
currently ranks as the second largest bankruptcy in U.S. history after WorldCom, Inc.'s July
2002 bankruptcy of $103.9 billion. Bankruptcydata.com, The 15 Largest Bankruptcies 1980-
Present, http://www.bankruptcydata.com/research/15_largest.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2006)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See Cunningham, supra note 9, at 924 (discussing the initial political and public
response to the Enron bankruptcy). Despite the bankruptcy of the seventh largest company in
the U.S., the markets held steady and Congressional action, including action on over forty
reform bills, was "put on the back burner." Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the
transactions and accounting practices that led to Enron's rise and fall, see Cunningham, supra
note 9, at 928-29 (explaining Enron's ethical and accounting irregularities).
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Crossing, and Adelphia Communications.27 During the first half of 2002, every
new day seemed to bring forth another company that had restated its financial
statements.28 Underlying each of these restatements was another story of
profiteering by the executives of these troubled companies or of the failure of
an external accounting firm or investment analyst to provide honest and
unbiased information.29 With the extensive level of participation in the equity
markets, these bankruptcies and scandals further decimated the net worth of
millions of Americans.30
B. The Birth of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Knowing that legislative action was almost guaranteed, the presidents of
the Securities Industry Association and the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants urged Congress not to overreact in responding to these
scandals. 3' They warned that a rush to provide legislative remedies could
create extraordinarily negative unintended consequences that could further
harm the economy. Even policymakers, such as Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Alan Greenspan, pressed for legislative restraint.32 However,
following WorldCom's June 25th earnings restatement, Congress could not
ignore the mounting political pressure for action, particularly in the face of the
upcoming mid-term elections.33
27. See Jennifer S. Recine, Note, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty
Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1537 (2002) (recounting
the major bankruptcies that "cause[d] market upheaval and public outrage").
28. See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that in the first six months of 2002, 112
telecom companies restated prior earnings).
29. See Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 127, 127 (2002) (discussing the causes of the decline of
public confidence in the market).
30. See id. at 127 (stating that from March 2000 through September 2002, investors' net
worth decreased by almost $8.5 trillion).
31. See Joseph A. Castelluccio III, Note, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business: Section
404 and the Case for a Small Business Exemption, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 429, 450 (2005)
(reviewing events that led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
32. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Stem School of
Business, New York University (Mar. 26, 2002), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/2002/200203262/default.htm (discussing corporate governance in the wake
of the Enron bankruptcy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Greenspan
stated: "We have to be careful... not to look to a significant expansion of regulation as the
solution to current problems .... Regulation has, over the years, proven only partially
successful in dissuading individuals from playing with the rules of accounting." Id.
33. See Marlantes, supra note 7, at I (discussing the political ramifications of the recent
increase in public ownership of stock). According to Marlantes, individuals that own shares are
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At the time, the Sarbanes-Oxley bill was the only piece of legislation
pending before Congress.34 While Congress had discussed many of the bill's
ideas and proposals prior to the current crisis, it had never seriously considered
enacting these reforms.35 As a result, the majority of politicians, publicly held
corporations, and interested organizations had never studied these ideas.36
However, reform-minded legislators capitalized on the high level of public
support for reform and pushed the bill to a vote in the Senate.37 The political
pressure for action was so great that the bill passed unanimously. 38 The House
of Representatives also offered little in the way of resistance, with only three
dissenting votes.39 These votes do not really reflect congressional support for
the bill but are more a product of the circumstances. One Congressman noted
that, given "the environment that we're in, virtually anything could have passed
the Congress., 40 President Bush echoed these sentiments as he signed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law due to the "public outrage" over the business
scandals.4 '
more likely to vote in political elections. Id. Furthermore, about half of those with investments
say that the market decline has had a significant impact upon their retirement planning, a major
source of concern. Id. As people tend to vote pocketbook issues, both parties needed to take an
aggressive stance in combating corporate scandals in the face of upcoming mid-term elections.
Id.
34. See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 46 (reviewing the legislative actions that produced the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act). In fact, many politicians still believed that the bill could be defeated less
than a month before its passage. David S. Hilzenrath, How Congress Rode a "Storm' to
Corporate Reform, WASH. POST, July 28, 2002, at Al (detailing the events that lead to the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
35. See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 46 (discussing prior legislative attempts at corporate
reform).
36. See id. (revealing that few people considered a regulatory response likely, even after
the Enron scandal).
37. See Cunningham, supra note 9, at 924 (discussing the effect that public support had
upon getting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed).
38. See Hilzenrath, supra note 34, at Al (detailing the surge of public support for reform
prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). Senators were so concerned with appearing
soft on corporate reform that not a single amendment of the seven prepared by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants for the Senate debate was sponsored. Id.
39. See 148 CONG. REc. H5462.02 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (showing that the bill passed
the house by a vote of 423-3).
40. See Hilzenrath, supra note 34, at Al (quoting Senator Phil Gramm).
41. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 46-47 (discussing President Bush's disappointment in
needing to sign the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). However, the President's disappointment did not
result in any delay in signing the bill. The President signed the bill into law the day it was
presented to him. Id.; see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in
Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at AI (stating that "President Bush signed a sweeping
corporate-fraud bill.., with central provisions that he opposed just three weeks ago").
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The criticism mounted quickly following the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.42 While critics agreed that the current state of corporate governance
needed the government's focus, they took exception to the method used to
address the issue.43 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, hailed as "the most far-reaching
reform[] of American business practice[s] since the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt,""' passed into law a mere eight months after Enron's bankruptcy.
45
In contrast the last time this country saw such sweeping corporate reform,
President Roosevelt signed the Securities Act of 1933 into law over three and a
half years following the stock market crash of 1929.46  Aware of this
discrepancy, critics called the Sarbanes-Oxley Act "a hasty, panicked reaction
of an electorate looking for an easy fix to the apparent 'problem' that stock
prices go down as well as up., 47 They further charged that by acting "quickly
and without a lot of study," Congress has created a law that will have serious
42. See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 49-52 (relating the immediate reactions of executives,
corporate lawyers, and scholars).
43. See Anthony Lin, One Year After Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Many Officers See Need, but
Grumble Nonetheless, N.Y. L.J., July 31, 2003, at 1 (discussing the attitudes of top executives
and corporate lawyers towards the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
44. Bumiller, supra note 41, at Al (quoting President Bush).
45. See id. at Al (stating that the signing of the Sarbanes-Oxley bill in July 2002 was the
end of a process begun by Enron's bankruptcy in December 2001).
46. See Castelluccio, supra note 31, at 434-37 (discussing the history of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
47. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 49 (quoting Professor Larry Ribstein). This discrepancy
may not be as significant as critics think. The Securities Act of 1933 was passed only after a
lengthy investigation and significant hearings. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN
CORPORATE FINANCE 1 (3d ed. 2003) (stating that legislation was enacted after more than two
years of hearings and investigations). These hearings were required to "galvanize[] broad public
support for direct federal regulation of the stock markets." Id. at 2. Other commentators have
noted that these hearings "were orchestrated to develop an explanation of the market crash as
having been caused by market manipulation, fraud, and abuse by financial firms, in order to
implement an agenda for market regulation." Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1592 (2005). Some have even
suggested that Congress exaggerated the issues that led to the stock market crash in 1929 to
galvanize sufficient public support to enact regulatory legislation. See Castelluccio, supra note
31, at 435 (claiming that these hearings were able to achieve remedial legislation after
"diminish[ing] the public's faith in the nation's financial institutions"). These claims make it
appear that the long delay between the stock market crash of 1929 and reform resulted not from
careful study, but from a planned manipulation of public sentiment. Yet, in the case of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress "resisted [acting] until they saw a tidal wave" of public demand
for reform. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 46 (quoting Professor John Coffee). Under these
circumstances it appears that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a much more legitimate representation
of the will of the people than the Securities Act of 1933.
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"unintended consequences. '48 Primarily, they warned that formal compliance
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act-especially Section 404-would impose
potentially onerous costs on companies.49
C. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Section 404 is often confused as synonymous with, instead of a part of, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This confusion results from the significant exposure
given to Section 404 in the media. This section provides a brief overview of
these often ignored provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, then discusses
Section 404 in greater detail.
1. The Act at a Glance
The purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is "[t]o protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant
to the securities laws, and for other purposes. 50  To achieve this goal and
prevent the reoccurrences of the problems that surfaced at the recently
disgraced companies, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits corporate loans to
officers, places further limitations on insider transactions, enhances auditor
independence by removing undue influences, and increases the criminal
penalties for violators.5 '
To improve the integrity of audits of public companies, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act seeks to remove the undue influences on auditors. First,
independent directors must hold all positions on a company's audit
committee. 2 This requirement attempts to prevent audit boards from being
controlled by, or simply deferring to, chief officers within the company.
3
Second, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits accounting firms from providing
48. Lin, supra note 43, at 1.
49. See id. (discussing the concerns of the business community with the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act).
50. Introduction to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
51. See Aronson, supra note 29, at 132 (explaining some of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's key
provisions).
52. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(m)(3). To be considered independent, audit committee
members cannot, other than in their capacity as an audit committee member, "accept any
consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or... be an affiliated person of
the issuer or any subsidiary thereof." Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(m)(3)(B).
53. See Aronson, supra note 29, at 139-41 (explaining that corporate boards were often
aware of and ignored accounting improprieties).
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both audit and non-audit services contemporaneously.54 This prohibition
prevents companies from holding out lucrative consulting engagements as
an incentive for their auditors to provide more favorable audit treatment.55
To address the loss of public confidence in financial statements,
audited and unaudited, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that the chief
executive officer and the principal financial officer must certify each
annual and quarterly report.5 6 These certifications provide that the officers
have reviewed the report, that the report has no untrue statements of
material facts, and that the financial statements fairly reflect the financial
conditions and results of the company's operations.57 In addition to these
assertions, the officers must provide substantial disclosures regarding the
company's internal controls.5 8 To enhance the seriousness of these
certifications, Congress provided the Sarbanes-Oxley Act with some teeth.
Any officer who knowingly certifies a report that does not meet these
requirements may be fined up to $1,000,000 and be imprisoned up to ten
years.5 9 Any officer who willingly certifies a report that does not meet
these requirements may be fined up to $5,000,000 and be imprisoned up to
twenty years. 60 These provisions force the chief officers of a company to
be more directly involved in the accounting and financial practices of the
company.
These regulations provide just a cursory look at the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act's extensive reach. This reform restructured every aspect of a public
company, from the board room to the field accounting office. However, the
majority of these revolutionary changes are outside the scope of this Note.
This Note focuses on the current crisis facing small businesses across the
country as a result of the pending implementation of Section 404.61
54. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201 (g). Non-audit services encompass a wide array of activities
from bookkeeping to management consulting. Id. This section was the main impetus behind
the major accounting firms divesting their more profitable consulting branches.
55. See Aronson, supra note 29, at 138-39 (stating Congress's concerns that consulting
engagements generated three times more revenue than audits).
56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(1), (2).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 302(a)(4).
59. Id. § 906(c)(1).
60. Id. § 906(c)(2).
61. Currently, accelerated filers have been required to comply with the requirements of
Section 404 since their first fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004. Internal Control
Over Financial Reporting, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.308, 229.308 (2004). The term "accelerated filer"
has recently been redefined, but is essentially any domestic company with more than $75
million in public equity. Definitions, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005). The companies that are
not accelerated filers, including foreign issuers, must comply with Section 404 for fiscal years
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2. Section 404
The most widely known and despised regulations mandated by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act are those found in Section 404. The rules in Section
40462 require a company's annual report to include a management
assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and
procedures.63 In addition, Section 404 requires the company's external
auditor to "attest to, and report on" this assessment made by management.6
This language requires that the auditor report on management's assertions
as well as opine upon an audit of the company's internal controls.65
The management assertion report must contain a statement in which
management acknowledges responsibility for "establishing and maintaining
an adequate internal control structure" as well as providing an assertion as
to the effectiveness of this control structure.66 In order to be able to
provide an honest assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls,
management must "document, evaluate, and test controls that are deemed
significant to the financial reporting process. 67 During this process most
ending after July 15, 2006. Postponement of Reports on Internal Control over Financial
Reporting for Non-Accelerated Filers and Foreign Issuers, 70 Fed. Reg. 11,528 (2005) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228,229, 240, 249). At this time the SEC is considering a final
rule that would extend this deadline one more year. Management's Report on Internal Control
Over Financial Reporting and Certification Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of
Companies that Are Not Accelerated Filers, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,825 (2005).
62. As is often the case, Congress has provided only a sketch of the big picture and left
the details to be filled in by someone else. Congress gave the job of filling in these details to the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a private non-profit company created
to "oversee the audit of public companies that are subject to the securities law ... in order to
protect the interests of investors .... " Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(a). To accomplish this
purpose Congress directed PCAOB to establish standards and rules to be followed by applicable
companies and accounting firms. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103(a)(1). However, any standard that
PCAOB adopts is not effective unless it is approved by the SEC. See Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, Standards-setting, http://www.pcaobus.org/Standard
s/Standardssetting.aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2006) (providing a detailed outline of the
organization's standard setting process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
PCAOB established Audit Standard 2 as the guidance for Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, An Audit
of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of
Financial Statements 3 (2005). For convenience and simplicity, Auditing Standard No. 2 and
its effects will be attributed directly to Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
63. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404(a)(2).
64. Id. § 404(b).
65. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 and Auditing Standard No. 2,
N.Y. L.J., May 20,2004, at 5 (providing an overview of the major requirements of Section 404).
66. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404(a).
67. CRA INT'L, SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 COSTS AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES:
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companies identify and correct internal deficiencies or redesign their
current internal controls altogether.68 While the burden of an extra report
does not seem insurmountable, a company's internal controls touch every
aspect of the business. 69 This expansive reach of internal controls in a
company means that the effective documentation of controls will require
participation of employees from every department at every level of the
hierarchy."7 In addition, the external auditors will essentially duplicate this
work so that they may report on management's assessment, as well as
provide the basis for their own opinion on controls.
71
III. The Aftermath of Section 404
This Part explains how the law of unintended consequences
manifested itself in the requirements of Section 404. This rather innocuous
Section of a wide-reaching Act would prove to present the largest burden
for formal compliance. Even worse, the circumstances surrounding the
new legislation proved particularly onerous for smaller companies. These
issues elicited a quick response from the SEC, an attempt to address the
fears of smaller companies.
SURVEY UPDATE (2005), available at http://www.crai.com/pubs/pub_4896.pdf (describing the
requirements of Section 404).
68. See Comment on Section 404 from PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/soxcomp/soxcomp-stauffer.pdf (commenting on corporate actions during the initial
year of Section 404 implementation) [hereinafter PricewaterhouseCoopers Comment]; see also
Learning to Love Sarbanes-Oxley, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Nov. 21, 2005, http://www.business
week.com/magazine/content/05_47/b3960113.htm (discussing the benefits companies have
experienced as a result of Section 404) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. See JAMES HAMILTON & N. PETER RASMUSSEN, GUIDE TO INTERNAL CONTROLS UNDER
SECTION 404 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 17-19 (2004) (defining internal controls). The
authors state: "[The scope of internal control extends to policies, plans, procedures, processes,
systems, activities, functions, projects, initiatives, and endeavors of all types at all levels of a
company." Id. at 19.
70. See id. at 18 (explaining that internal control is "effected by an entities board of
directors, management, and other personnel").
71. See PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD AUDITING STANDARD No. 2,
AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION
WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCL4 STATEMENTS IM 4-6 (2005), available at http://pcaobus.org/
Rules/Rules of the Board/Auditing-Standard_2.pdf(establishing the auditor's objective in an
audit of internal controls).
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A. Unexpected Costs
The SEC immediately recognized that Section 404 would impose a
significant burden upon companies.72 In the subsequent months, however,
estimated costs continued to rise.73 One report estimated that the costs of
compliance were likely to be twenty times that of the SEC's initial estimate.74
These skyrocketing estimates have caused an increasing number of executives
to question whether the benefits from compliance are worth such costs. 75
These compliance costs can effectively be separated into two major
categories: internal compliance costs and external auditor expenses.76 The
internal costs are the costs of the company designing, documenting, and testing
internal controls." Most companies experienced significantly more expenses
than they anticipated, as a result of significant documentation and remediation
efforts for their internal control structures.78
More importantly, companies incur these costs disproportionately to their
size. One study showed that larger companies expended $7.3 million in their
first year of compliance, while smaller companies expended $1.5 million.79
72. See Securities Act Release No. 33-8238, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47986,
Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26068, [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 86,023 (June 5, 2003) (estimating the annual cost of compliance with Section 404(a) to
be $1.24 billion).
73. See ALEX DAVERN ET AL., AM. ELECTRONICS ASS'N, SARBANES-OxLEY SECTION 404:
THE 'SECTION' OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND ITS IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESS 6 (William
T. Archey ed., 2004), available at http://www.aeanet.org/soxreport (charting the increase in
estimated costs from June 2003 through December 2004).
74. See id. at 6 (estimating total costs of Section 404 to be $35 billion).
75. See, e.g., J. Hodges, Sarbanes-Oxley: After the Honeymoon, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Oct.
2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim4153/is5_60/ai_110221996 (documenting that
only thirty percent of executives surveyed had a favorable opinion of the act).
76. See CRA INT'L, supra note 67, at 11 (explaining the costs involved in Section 404
implementation). "Internal compliance costs" include the cost of hours expended by issuer
personnel, fees paid to providers other than the independent auditor. Id. This term also
includes expenses related to the training and hiring of new staff, and additional acquisitions,
such as software. Id. "External auditor expenses" represent only the portion of the audit fee
attributed to the incremental audit procedures required to audit the issuer's internal controls in
compliance with Section 404. Id. at 12.
77. See PricewaterhouseCoopers Comment, supra note 68, at 6 (commenting on Section
404 after one year of implementation).
78. Id. at 5. PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that these two activities accounted for
approximately forty percent of all time spent on Section 404 compliance. Id.
79. See CRA INT'L, supra note 67, at 5-6 (investigating the first and second year costs of
implementing Section 404). The survey defined companies with a market capitalization greater
than $700 million as large companies and companies with a market capitalization of $75 million
to $700 million as small companies. Id.
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While these figures show that larger companies bear a heavier burden, the costs
as a percentage of revenue are significantly higher for smaller companies.80
One study estimates that these costs as a percentage of revenue increase
exponentially as the company's market capitalization decreases.8 ' Advocates
for smaller companies assert that this discrepancy is the result of a one-size-fits-
all approach to compliance, in that the same standard of compliance a $5 billion
company uses is applied to an $80 million company.8 2 These advocates have
denounced Section 404 as a "regressive tax on small and medium companies."83
B. The SEC Responds to the Small Business Community
Proponents of smaller companies quickly made these disproportionate
costs known to the SEC. 84 Within one month of the initial stage of compliance
with Section 404, the SEC had established a taskforce to make
recommendations on tailoring the current rules to be more compatible with
smaller companies.8 5 The SEC specifically directed this taskforce, the
Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on Smaller Public
Companies (the Advisory Committee), to assess the effects of the current
regulatory system upon smaller companies and recommend changes that may
be needed.8 6 The Advisory Committee's main objective is to consider the cost-
benefit relationship between investor protection, the current regulatory system,
and capital formation by smaller companies.87
80. Id. The survey found that small companies' implementation costs as a percentage of
revenue were 0.46%, while for large companies that figure was only 0.09%. Id.
81. See DAVERN, supra note 73, at 5 (estimating that a company with less than $100
million in market capitalization will expend 2.55% of their revenues on Section 404
compliance).
82. See id. (describing the inequitable nature of holding small and large companies to the
same standards).
83. Id. (discussing the inverse relationship between a company's size and the percentage
of their revenue dedicated to Section 404 costs).
84. See Andrew Parker, SEC to Consider Rules for Small Companies, FIN. TIMES
(LoNDON), Dec. 17, 2004, at 27 (stating that the SEC acted upon a wave of complaints in
considering specialized rules for smaller companies).
85. Id.
86. Sec.& Exch. Comm'n Advisory Committee on Smaller Pub. Cos. Charter art. B (Mar.
23, 2005), available at http://sec.gov/rules/other/acspc-charter.pdf The Advisory Committee's
final report is due to be submitted to the SEC by April 23, 2006. Press Release, U. S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, SEC's Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies Solicits Comments
on Draft Final Report (Mar. 3, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-32.htm (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Advisory Committee on Smaller Pub. Cos. Charter art. B, Mar.
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In a further gesture of good faith towards smaller companies, the SEC
twice postponed the compliance date by one year.88 Stressing the importance of
Section 404, the SEC provided these extensions to allow smaller "companies to
devote the necessary resources to make sure those requirements are
implemented effectively." 89 To allow the Advisory Committee to complete its
work and to gather additional market information, the SEC provided another
one-year extension to these smaller companies. 90 Emboldened by a third
extension, advocates for smaller businesses increased their assault on Section
404.
IV. The Small Business Question: To Comply or Not to Comply?
This Part outlines the three consequences of Section 404 that small
businesses view as most crippling. These factors provide the basis of the small
business argument for substantial relief from Section 404. However, this Part
provides recent evidence showing that these factors are much more manageable
than companies have anticipated. As a result, the small business community
does not need the drastic measures they have hastily proposed. Ultimately, this
section proposes a staggered implementation approach that allows small
businesses to comply with Section 404 in a manageable fashion.
23,2005, http://sec.gov/rules/other/acspc-charter.pdf. The Advisory Committee released some
preliminary recommendations in December of 2005. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N ADVISORY COMM.
ON SMALLER PUB. COS., PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE INTERNAL CONTROLS SUBCOMMITTEE
(2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The Advisory Committee
recommended companies with market capitalization of less than $700 million should be
exempted from the external audit requirements of Section 404. Id. Much of the basis of these
recommendations appears to come directly from the American Electronics Association (AEA)
report. Id. Many of the assumptions and conclusions in this AEA report are becoming
questionable as more data becomes available. See infra Part IV.B (providing evidence that
compliance costs are not as significant as many believe).
88. See Securities Act Release No. 33-8545, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51293, 84
S.E.C. Docket 3226 (Mar. 2, 2005) (extending the compliance date for non-accelerated and
foreign filers to the fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2006); Securities Act Release No. 33-
8392, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49313, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26357,
S.E.C. Docket 673 (Feb. 24, 2004) (extending the compliance date for non-accelerated and
foreign filers to the fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2005).
89. Press Release, U. S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Extension of Compliance Dates for Non-
Accelerated Filers and Foreign Private Issuers Regarding Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting Requirements (Mar. 2, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/ news/press/2005-
25.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
90. See Securities Act Release No. 33-8618, Exchange Act Release No. 34-52492 (Sept.
22, 2005), http://www.sec.gov.rules/final/fr33-8618.pdf (extending the compliance date for non-
accelerated and foreign filers to the fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2007).
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A. The Small Business Argument
Small businesses are the backbone of the American economy.91 They
employ more than half of all private sector employees and create the majority of
the nonfarm private gross domestic product. 92 Representing over ninety-nine
percent of all employers, they are responsible for sixty to eighty percent of net
new jobs each year.93 These contributions show how vital small businesses are
to the well being of the economy; any overbearing or restrictive policies could
potentially have devastating effects.94
Small businesses claim that forcing them to adhere to Section 404 would
have a chilling effect on the economy.95 This chilling effect results not just
from the extensive resources utilized in formal compliance with the provision,
but also from a significant disincentive for small companies to become or to
remain public. 96 One survey of mid-sized companies found that the average
cost of being a public company has nearly doubled in the wake of Sarbanes-
Oxley.97 Advocates for small business believe these increased costs are the
impetus behind the increase in companies opting to delist their shares instead of
accepting the burdens and costs of Sarbanes-Oxley.98 In 2003, 198 companies
chose to delist their shares, approximately three times the amount of companies
that delisted in the previous year.99 In 2004, the number of companies delisting
remained high with another 134 deregistering.100 Most companies that have
91. See Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm'r, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Remarks before
Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation (Sept. 23, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092203cag.htm (discussing the importance of small
business to the American economy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
92. See id. (providing statistics regarding the contributions of small businesses).
93. Id.
94. See id. (discussing why the SEC considers the repercussions of expansive regulation
carefully).
95. See Nathan Wilda, Comment, David Pays for Goliath's Mistake: The Costly Effect
Sarbanes-Oxley Has on Small Companies, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 671, 684-85 (2004)
(positing possible results of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the economy).
96. See Glassman, supra note 91 (relating complaints that these compliance costs are
acting as a disincentive to become public).
97. See Tamara Loomis, Cost of Compliance Soars After Sarbanes-Oxley, N.Y. L.J., May
1, 2003, at I (citing a Foley & Lardner study that showed the average cost of being public
increased from $1.3 million to $2.5 million).
98. See Study: Scrutiny, Costs Fuel Rise in Delistings, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 14, 2004, at C3.
(citing a Wharton School of Business study on the increase of delistings following Sarbanes-
Oxley).
99. Id.
100. See Amy Feldman, What Does Sarbanes-Oxley Mean for Companies That Want to Go
Public?, INC. MAGAZINE, Sept. 2005, at 138 (describing the results of a Wharton School of
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delisted claimed to have done so to avoid the significant costs of regulation.'01
The inability of small companies to access the public markets presents a major
problem for both the job market and the economy in general.'0 2 The inability to
access cheaper capital severely impacts the prospects of a small company
attempting to expand. 10 3 Small business advocates claim that all of these
unintended consequences are proving that the one-size-fits-all approach of
Sarbanes-Oxley and, more specifically, that Section 404 does not properly
balance the costs of compliance against the benefits gained by investors.l°4
Advocates for small business have even advanced the argument that any
benefits gained by the investing public are not worth the cost of compliance.
They claim that the investing public is already aware of the added risk that is
inherent in an investment in small business. Therefore, Section 404's
additional protections, involving more reliable financial statements, would not
benefit the type of person that typically would invest in smaller companies.
Advocates for small business also argue that complying with Section 404
would give investors a false sense of security in small companies. 0 5 This false
sense of security would attract investors that are not prepared for the inherently
more risky nature of these companies to small companies.
This false sense of security comes directly from the failure of Section 404
to accomplish its purpose. Small businesses point to a study by the Association
of Certified Fraud Examiners that shows internal controls are less likely to
discover a million-dollar fraud than discovery by accident. 1°6 Executives of
smaller companies are significantly more involved in daily operations than in
larger companies, which further exacerbates the problem. 107 This significant
Business study).
101. See Study, supra note 98, at C3 (citing a Wharton School of Business study on the
reasons for the increase of delistings in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley). These claims must be
viewed skeptically, as the study also found evidence that companies delisted to "evade the
outside monitoring and additional scrutiny." Id.
102. See Glassman, supra note 91 (discussing the expansive effects of hindering small
business growth).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., J. Hodges, Sarbanes-Oxley: After the Honeymoon, INTERNALAuDrroR, Oct.
2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m4153/is_5_60/ai_ 110221996 (documenting that
only thirty percent of executives surveyed had a favorable opinion of the act) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
105. See DAvERN, supra note 73, at 2 (stating that one of Section 404's main problems is
that it will provide "investors a false sense of security").
106. See id. at 4 (showing that in million dollar fraud schemes internal controls uncovered
eight percent while eighteen percent were discovered by accident).




level of involvement by executives provides them with a greater ability to
circumvent internal controls and perpetrate a devastating fraud. 08  Small
businesses contend that the other provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act can
protect investors against these issues more efficiently. 109
To remedy the perceived injustices done to small companies through this
reform, proponents of small business have offered three major categories of
reforms: (1) Make compliance voluntary for smaller companies," 0 (2) exempt
smaller companies,"' or (3) tailor the regulations to provide a more cost
effective approach for smaller companies.! 12 Each of these proposals has
significant advantages but comes at an extraordinary expense to investors.
1. Voluntary Compliance
Proponents of providing companies with the option of voluntarily
complying with Sarbanes-Oxley claim that this approach will ease the burden
on these companies at no expense to the investing public. 1 3 The simplest
method of voluntary compliance follows the "check-the-box" method of
taxation.114 The "check-the-box" method of taxation allows unincorporated
entities to choose to be taxed as a pass-through entity or as a corporate entity by
checking the appropriate box on their tax form.' 15 The goal of the "check-the-
box" method is to end the uncertainty experienced by unincorporated entities in
determining their taxation structure. 1 16 This simplified approach to taxation has
108. Id
109. See id. at 14 (identifying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's cost effective provisions).
110. See J. Brent Wilkins, Comment, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effects
of Restoring Shareholder Confidence, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 339, 355-56 (2004) (proposing that
smaller companies be allowed to voluntarily adopt Sarbanes-Oxley reforms if they so choose).
111. See Castelluccio, supra note 31, at 470 (proposing an exemption from Section 404 for
small companies).
112. See DAVERN, supra note 73, at 8 (urging the SEC to adjust Section 404 to make it
more equitable to smaller companies).
113. See Wilkins, supra note 110, at 356 ("[G]iving public companies the election option
regarding Sarbanes-Oxley will not harm the investing public.").
114. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3 (2004) (allowing an unincorporated entity the ability to
elect pass-through or corporate taxation by checking a box on the tax form).
115. Id.
116. See Victor E. Fleischer, "If It Looks Like A Duck": Corporate Resemblance and
Check-The-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 518, 531 (1996) (discussing the
expected benefits of the "check-the-box" approach). Prior to adoption of the "check-the-box"
method, unincorporated entities were required to invest significant resources to have lawyers
determine if the entity's structure required partnership or corporate tax treatment. Id. Many
smaller entities were unable to afford these services, "subjecting them to uncertain tax
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eased the burden these entities have experienced in requiring outside counsel
under the prior rules. 17 Proponents feel this approach would have a similar
effect on companies if utilized as an approach to relief from Sarbanes-Oxley
reforms." 8 Under this method, companies could pick and choose which, if any,
portions of Sarbanes-Oxley they will comply with after significant analysis. 19
This voluntary compliance approach to Sarbanes-Oxley will allow companies
to expend resources on government regulations when such expenditures would
not interfere with business objectives. 20 In doing so, smaller companies will
not delist, and private companies will not be scared from venturing into the
capital markets, as they are likely to do under mandatory compliance with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.' 21 Maintaining the attractiveness of the capital markets
will allow smaller companies to continue to utilize the markets to raise capital
effectively.122 By retaining the attractiveness of the capital markets for smaller
public and private companies, this elective approach will protect investors from
being harmed by a loss of information. Although these companies will not
comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, they will still be subject to the SEC's
other reporting requirements. 23 These other reporting requirements would
provide investors with significantly more information than if these companies
were to delist.
treatment." Id. "Check-the-box" taxation has limited these burdensome legal expenses for
larger companies and removed uncertainty from smaller companies. Id. at 531-32.
117. See id. at 531 (discussing the reasoning behind adopting the "check-the-box"
approach).
118. See Wilkins, supra note 110, at 356 (stating that a "check-the-box" approach would
allow companies to apply a cost-benefit analysis prior to complying with any provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley).
119. See id. at 356 (advocating that the "check-the-box" approach allows companies to
make the compliance "decision at the business level").
120. See id. (advocating the "check-the-box" approach to allow companies the ability to
escape overly burdensome regulations).
121. See id. (proposing that an elective approach to Sarbanes-Oxley would not bar
companies with insufficient resources to dedicate to compliance from the capital markets).
Some commentators have begun to question how many companies will actually leave the public
markets in order to "avoid[] regulatory compliance costs because being a public company is so
advantageous." Andrew Skouvakis, Comment, Exiting the Public Markets: A Difficult Choice
for Small Public Companies Struggling with Sarbanes-Oxley, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 1279, 1296
(2005).
122. Wilkins, supra note 110, at 356.
123. See id. at 356-57 (hypothesizing that a mandatory approach to compliance would
result in companies delisting in significant numbers to avoid the costs of compliance). Those
companies would no longer be subject to the SEC's other requirements. Id. This would harm
investors by reducing the transparency of these companies' financial health. Id. By keeping
these companies under SEC regulation, investors will still have significant assurances
concerning the information provided by these companies. Id. at 356-57.
1204
TAKE IT SLOW
This argument also contends, however, that companies that choose not to
comply with Sarbanes-Oxley will suffer at the hands of the marketplace.
Investors will have knowledge of which companies have chosen not to comply
with the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and will accordingly alter the stock
prices of these companies. 24 As a result, regulation will eventually occur
within the marketplace itself, at a more efficient level than when regulated by
the SEC.
125
Despite the perceived advantages of this proposal, small business will not
experience these suggested benefits because of three fundamental flaws. First,
by allowing companies to comply electively with the regulations of Sarbanes-
Oxley, confusion would reign supreme, as investors would have no easy
method to determine which companies have complied with Sarbanes-Oxley and
which have not. The resulting uncertainty would force investors to follow each
of their investments intensely so they could act appropriately on any change in
a company's compliance position. This uncertainty would also greatly affect
small investors that typically invest in mutual funds. Unless a mutual fund was
established as a "compliance only" fund, investors would be unable to ensure
that they were investing in compliant companies without devoting significant
study to the complex prospectus for that particular fund. This intense level of
dedication would frighten casual and long term investors from participating in
the markets, removing significant amounts of capital in the process.
Second, this approach assumes that sufficient information is available for
the marketplace to reflect appropriately a company's compliance stance in the
share price. This proposal also assumes that larger investors will be able to
apply pressure on companies, forcing them to comply. These assumptions may
be correct for larger companies, but smaller companies garner little in the way
of attention from institutional investors, analysts, or the media. 26 Without
sufficient information a market cannot efficiently adjust a company's stock
price. This removes the key motivation for self-regulation in the marketplace.
Further, as institutional investors do not follow smaller companies, 27 the
124. See Wilkins, supra note 110, at 357 (hypothesizing that an efficient marketplace will
utilize a company's decision to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley in calculating the share price).
125. See id. at 357-58 (predicting that self-regulation by the marketplace is preferable
"because 'market actors' will be informed and motivated to ensure the propriety of financial
disclosures"). Wilkins provides an example of this by highlighting the actions of the Vanguard
Group, the second largest mutual fund company in the United States. Id. at 358. The Vanguard
Group is using its financial might to force companies to comply with the new regulations. Id.
126. Arthur Levitt, Jr., Commentary, A Misguided Exemption, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27,2006,
at A8.
127. See id. (stating that most institutional investors avoid smaller companies because of
the increased financial risk).
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pressure for a company to change its stance on compliance would have to come
from an individual investor. That any individual investor acting alone would
have sufficient clout to exert sufficient pressure on a company for it to opt to
self-regulate is very unlikely.
Finally, assuming that sufficient information is available to regulate the
marketplace efficiently, then this proposal would fail to provide small
businesses with any relief. The central purpose of allowing companies to
comply voluntarily with Sarbanes-Oxley is to prevent regulation from
inhibiting access to capital markets in order to allow companies to raise capital
inexpensively.128 However, if a company that does not comply with Sarbanes-
Oxley experiences a drop in stock price, the cost of raising capital in the equity
markets for that company will be significantly increased. Therefore, raising
capital through the stock market is no more attractive for companies that choose
not to comply than for companies under a mandatory compliance scheme.
Voluntary compliance would likely have a drastic effect on the
marketplace by causing mass confusion among investors or permitting smaller
companies to escape retribution for not complying with Sarbanes-Oxley. If the
markets could effectively deal with these issues, small companies would be
unable to utilize the equity markets as a source of cheap capital without
complying with the reforms of Sarbanes-Oxley. As a result, this proposal is
unlikely to provide small business with an effective source of relief.
2. Exemptions from Compliance
Two alternative proposals could also help exempt smaller companies from
compliance. One recommends a complete exemption.' 29  The other
recommends an application process, granting an exemption upon a showing
that compliance would impose a significant hardship. 3 0 These proposals also
center on the overly burdensome costs of compliance effectively barring
smaller companies from participation in capital markets.' 3' However, these
128. See Wilkins, supra note 110, at 356 (proposing an elective approach to Sarbanes-
Oxley so that companies would not lose easy access to capital markets, an important source of
cheap capital).
129. See Castelluccio, supra note 31, at 470 (suggesting an exemption from Section 404
for small companies).
130. See Wilda, supra note 95, at 690 (maintaining that companies should be allowed to
apply for an annual exemption from compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley). Although this is a
separate proposal, it will be discussed with the outright exemption argument because the end
result is the same for exempted companies.
131. See Castelluccio, supra note 31, at 464 ("[Tlhe immense and disproportionate
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proposals typically only demand an exemption from Section 404, claiming that
the other provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are cost-effective substitutes."'
By removing the burdens of Section 404, small companies would still have free
access to the capital markets and would continue to be an integral part of the
American economy. In addition, the other sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
protect investors from the threat of fraud and improper financial reporting.
Despite noble intentions, these proposals do not effectively address the
concerns of investors in their attempt to solve the problems perceived by the
small business community. As a result, these proposals will also fail to protect
small business access to cheap capital in the equity markets because exemptions
for small companies would wreak havoc on the capital markets. Two major
issues in the capital markets would arise from any exemption for small
businesses. First, small businesses would be relegated to a "second-class"
status in the marketplace. 133 Second, the marketplace likely would need to
establish new exchanges or sub-exchanges to handle the companies not subject
to Section 404 compliance to ease the confusion on investors.
Small businesses are already at a disadvantage in the marketplace. An
exemption from Section 404 would cement small businesses into a "second-
class" status. Currently many investors do not invest in smaller companies
because of the significantly increased risk associated with investing in a smaller
company, such as an increased sensitivity to economic downturns. 13 4 If these
companies were further removed from oversight through relief from internal
controls regulations, the risk associated with smaller companies would
increase.13' An increase in the risk of the investment would require a risk
premium 36 from these companies. 137 This risk premium would greatly increase
burden... impose[d] on small companies has restricted their access to capital.").
132. See id. at 472-73 (proposing that the SEC has other measures that would sufficiently
control wrongdoing without the additional costs of Section 404).
133. Levitt, supra note 126, at A8.
134. See id. (stating that most institutional investors avoid smaller companies because of
the increased financial risk). Smaller companies have significantly less resources and less
diverse product offerings than larger companies. As a result, these smaller companies have a
difficult time weathering economic downturns. At the same time, smaller companies provide
almost limitless upside for investors looking to get in to the next Microsoft on the ground floor.
This greater sensitivity to economic forces and incredible potential, however, causes the stock
prices of smaller companies to be highly volatile. This volatility is one reason why risk averse
investors typically do not invest in smaller companies. These risk averse investors do not
believe that the potential gains outweigh the possibility of losing their investment.
135. Id.
136. A risk premium may be considered as a form of compensation to the investor for
tolerating the additional risk of an investment compared to other investments. The riskier an
investment is, the higher rate of return an investor will require, such as through a lower initial
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their cost of raising capital, significantly decreasing the number of companies
that would access the markets as a source of equity.'38 Additionally, companies
that have already tapped the capital markets would find obtaining additional
funding less profitable. 39 This higher cost of capital would "hinder [the]
growth [of small businesses] as much as any onerous regulation."'
140
The second major problem of holding smaller companies to a different
standard than the rest of public companies would be the further stratification of
the capital markets. The major exchanges, such as the New York Stock
Exchange, have very strict requirements for companies listed with them. 4' To
accommodate the varying levels of compliance that would apply to companies,
either "sub-exchanges"'' 42 or new exchanges would need to emerge. 43 The
creation of these additional exchanges would impose significant costs on the
marketplace. The SEC would have to establish new regulatory schemes in
order to follow these less regulated companies properly, increasing the burden
on that agency. This increased burden likely would reduce the agency's
effectiveness or increase the burden on individual taxpayers to fund the new
schemes. The main benefit to the investing public of this expanded
stratification is that it would highlight those companies that do not comply with
regulation. However, this benefit would increase awareness of the risk of small
businesses as an investment vehicle. This increased awareness of risk would
raise the cost of raising capital for small business significantly. The additional
burden on the SEC and this increased cost of capital is too high a price to pay
for simply easing unnecessary confusion in the marketplace.
As a result, providing an exemption from Section 404 does not protect a
small company's ability to inexpensively raise capital in the equity markets. In
addition, given the costs of the subsequent restructuring of the markets and
regulatory environments, an exemption is not a cost-effective method of
providing investors with the protections that Congress intended.
stock price or a higher interest rate on a bond issue. Consequently, risky companies raise less
capital because they must offer a risk premium.




141. See N.Y. Stock Exchange, Listing Standards, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/
1022221392369.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2006) ("The Exchange's listing standards ensure the
quality and integrity of the NYSE list.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
142. A "sub-exchange" would be a secondary listing system on a currently existing
exchange.
143. See Wilkins, supra note 110, at 355 (discussing a stratified market as an alternative to
mandatory compliance with Section 404).
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3. Tailor the Requirements of Section 404
The third proposal also centers on the seemingly prohibitive costs of
compliance for small businesses. Advocates of tailoring the requirements of
Section 404 recommend eliminating significant steps of compliance to ease the
burden on small business. 44 This proposal recommends suspending all Section
404 requirements for a significant portion of the capital markets until this
section can be tailored properly to the needs of smaller businesses. 145 The
ultimate goal of tailoring the requirements of Section 404 is to allow small
businesses to comply at a price that is easily digestible by their executives.
46
This proposal, while the most reasonable approach suggested, would not
adequately provide consumers with the protections of Section 404 and would
not deliver any real value for small businesses. Tailoring the requirements of
Section 404 and holding smaller businesses to a different standard than the
remaining marketplace raises the same market confusion and stratification
problems raised under the other two proposals. 147 In addition, holding smaller
businesses to a lesser standard will harm, not help, investors. While
eliminating or easing the costs of compliance will potentially provide investors
with a more immediate return on their investment, the costs of non-compliance
are too great. In the five years before 2004, nearly three-quarters of all
financial restatements were from smaller companies. 148 This evidence shows
that smaller companies are in need of just as much, if not greater, regulation
than larger companies.
While these three proposals appear to be very different, they diverge from
each other only in the degree of relief from compliance that they offer. Each of
the proposals intends to relieve the direct and indirect cost burdens of Section
404. These proposals, however, are nothing more than a "hasty, panicked
reaction,"149 similar to the actions of Congress that brought about the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.
144. See DAVERN, supra note 73, at 9-12 (proposing ten cost-saving changes to current
Section 404 compliance requirements).
145. See id. at 12-13 (recommending that Section 404 compliance be suspended for all
companies with a market capitalization of less than $1 billion).
146. See id. at 12 (recommending that Section 404 be tailored so that annual compliance
costs are approximately $91,000).
147. See supra Part IV.A.1-2 (illustrating negative effects from providing small companies
with relief from Section 404 compliance).
148. Levitt, supra note 126, at A8 ("[N]early three-quarters of financial restatements were
reported by companies with annual revenues of less than $500 million.").
149. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 49 (quoting Professor Larry Ribstein).
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The initial problems for large companies complying with Section 404 have
scared small business executives. These executives feel that the overly
burdensome costs of formal compliance will produce a ripple effect that
magnifies the harm of Section 404. This fear has pushed the small business
community to demand significant relief from Section 404. However, President
Bush has already declared that "we won't let fear undermine our economy," 1
50
certainly not when these fears are unfounded to a great extent.
B. Saving Small Businesses from Themselves
The efforts of the proposals described in Part IV.A to reverse or prevent
the perceived damage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act would result in greater
unintended consequences for small businesses 151 than those that have extended
from the current regulations. Consequently, this Note proposes that small
companies and the investing public are served best by a staggered
implementation of Section 404 over three years, with full compliance due by
the end of the third year. Smaller companies that are already subject to the
requirements of Section 404 should be excused from having an external auditor
opine on their internal controls for two annual reporting cycles. However, so
that these companies do not regress during this period, the external auditor
would still need to provide a review of the internal controls. The reprieve
would effectively delay the more expensive audits of internal controls of
qualified companies. Under this approach, companies will disperse the costs
and pressures of implementing Section 404 over a greater time period. In
addition, this proposal allows those companies that have already made the
initial investment into Section 404 compliance to have a hiatus from the more
expensive audit process and allows the external audit community to develop
more cost-effective methods of auditing internal controls. This staggered
implementation process relieves small businesses of the burden of enduring the
hefty initial investment of compliance in a short period, and the investing
public will benefit from the added protection of Section 404 in every public
company. The following three sections will seek to explain the basis and
reasoning for this approach to implementation.
150. President George Bush, Remarks at Madison Central High School in Madison,
Mississippi, 38 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1319, 1322 (Aug. 7, 2002), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020807- 1.html (providing justification for the
recent corporate reforms, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
151. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the negative consequences of providing small
businesses with relief from Section 404 compliance).
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1. Rapidly Declining Costs of Compliance
The direct costs of compliance are the main motivation behind the small
business community seeking relief from Section 404.1"2 While the costs of
compliance for Section 404 are much higher than originally anticipated, small
companies will find that compliance costs will be cheaper than they are
expecting. Some of the negative attention that small business places on high
compliance costs is deserved, but much of these worries are the result of
insufficient or incomplete information.15 3 Even with the two-and-a-half year
delay between the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the issuance of the
first reports under the new requirements, the authorities at the SEC and
PCAOB still have not provided sufficient information and guidance to
implement the requirements effectively and efficiently.'54
Initial guidance did not come from authorities until five months prior to
the first fiscal year end before compliance was expected. 55  Authorities
clarified and expanded upon this guidance over the next six months. 56 As a
result, many companies attempting to comply with the legislation found
themselves short of the actual requirements that eventually were set forth.'57
This delay in guidance resulted in an extraordinary duplication of efforts, as
many tasks needed to be redone. 158 The small companies that have yet to
comply with Section 404 will have the benefit of being able to follow the
agency guidance available from the onset. As a result, smaller companies
seeking for the first time, to comply with Section 404, should see a significant
reduction in their initial compliance investment.
152. See DAvERN, supra note 73, at 4 (listing seven perceived flaws with Section 404, six
of which are related to compliance costs).
153. See id. at 6 (estimating the cost of compliance with Section 404 to be $35 billion). In
July 2004, Financial Executives International (FEI) released a study that estimated compliance
costs to be approximately $21 billion. Id. Five months later, in December 2004, the American
Electronics Association estimated compliance costs to be $35 billion. Id. According to their
report, this increase of $14 billion dollars was based on estimates from the earlier FEI study and
conversations with member CFOs. Id. This methodology appears very unlikely to yield a
reasonable method of estimating total compliance costs across all industries.
154. See PricewaterhouseCoopers Comment, supra note 68 (commenting on an SEC
release that interprets Sarbanes-Oxley).
155. LARRY E. RITTENBERG & PATRICIA K. MILLER, SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 WoRK:
LOOKING AT THE BENEFrrs 17 (2005) (noting that initial guidance was not released until June
2004).
156. Id. Many believe that the guidance the SEC has made available is still insufficient.
Id.
157. Id. (observing that the companies that had tried to comply with Section 404 were
forced to rework much of what they had already completed).
158. Id.
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In addition to, and somewhat as a result of, the lack of official guidance,
both auditors and companies were developing a methodology for complying
with Section 404.159 As a result, companies were inefficient and performed
unnecessary work during the initial compliance process.' 6 As of early 2006,
external auditors and public companies have completed two years of
compliance work and a body of"best practices" is now beginning to emerge. 161
A recent survey of companies finishing their second year of compliance work
found that "improved efficiency because of progress on the learning curve" was
the second-most identified source of savings between year one and year two
compliance costs.162 As of the proposed full compliance date, external auditors
and companies from all industries will have completed at least four reporting
cycles. By this time, the methodology and processes used in meeting the
requirements of Section 404 should have improved significantly. These
improvements should again produce significant savings in the initial
compliance costs for smaller companies, especially given the significant
savings already experienced in a single year.
The requisite extensive documentation of internal controls is the most
burdensome portion of first-year compliance costs. 163 While regulations have
required the maintenance of effective internal controls since 1977, most
companies have not documented their controls at a level of detail that would
have made complying with Section 404 quick or easy.164 This lack of
documentation is the direct result of executives not providing internal controls
159. See id. at 16 (observing that initial compliance work was done with methods
developed during the audit engagements); PricewaterhouseCoopers Comment, supra note 68
(noting that "management and external auditors were learning, interpreting, and applying
Section 404... on a real-time basis").
160. See RirrENBERG & MILLER, supra note 155, at 17 (observing that companies began
compliance work without proper guidance); see also PricewaterhouseCoopers Comment, supra
note 68 (noting that significant costs of compliance are attributable to uncertainty as to the
implementation requirements); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Commission
Statement on Implementation of Internal Control Reporting Requirements (May 16, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-74.htm (stating that "it... appears that some non-trivial
costs may have been unnecessary, due to excessive, duplicative or misfocused efforts") (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
161. See CRA INT'L, supra note 67, at 9 (surveying companies to gather data on the costs
of implementing Section 404).
162. Id. at2.
163. See PricewaterhouseCoopers Comment, supra note 68 (noting that documentation of
controls averaged twenty-five percent of all compliance efforts); CRA INr'L, supra note 67, at 9
(documenting the costs of implementing Section 404).
164. See PricewaterhouseCoopers Comment, supra note 68, at 5 (commenting on how
many companies have not documented existing internal controls).
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the consideration they should have been receiving. 65  The subsequent
documentation of internal controls has required an intensive use of resources.'66
Small businesses will experience cost benefits in two ways that initial
companies could not. First, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has made internal controls
an ever-present idea for most executives. As a result, smaller companies have
likely made efforts to strengthen their existing internal controls. In addition,
significant documentation is likely available for any new processes
implemented since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Second, the delay
for implementation will provide small businesses with the time to spread the
documentation process and costs over a significant period of time. While this
ability to absorb costs over time would not produce any true cost savings, small
businesses would not have to devote significant amounts of time and money to
compliance in a single year.
In addition to first year savings, research shows that annual compliance
costs decrease significantly after the first year.1 67 In smaller companies, the
compliance costs in the second year of compliance decreased thirty-nine
percent on average.168 This decrease directly contradicts the general sentiment
of small businesses, which had predicted that costs would remain high through
at least three years of compliance.' 69 Following this decrease in the costs
required to maintain compliance, many companies are already beginning to see
significant savings as a result of their Section 404 work.17
0
In each scenario regarding compliance costs, significant benefits are to be
found in implementing Section 404 over an extended period of time. While no
business wants to incur the costs that compliance requires, each passing day
shows that the process is no longer the unbearable cost burden that small
businesses initially feared. The incremental implementation method should
165. See DAVERN, supra note 73, at 15 (noting that most CFOs had never heard of the
internal controls framework used as the basis for Section 404, which was developed in the
1980s, prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
166. See PricewaterhouseCoopers Comment, supra note 68 (noting that documentation of
controls averaged twenty five percent of all compliance efforts); CRA INT'L, supra note 67, at 9
(revealing that documentation of internal controls represented the greatest proportion of
companies' compliance costs).
167. See CRA INT'L, supra note 67, at 6 (comparing first and second year costs of
compliance with Section 404 for smaller companies).
168. Id.
169. See DAVERN, supra note 73, at 6 (predicting that compliance costs would remain high
in years two and three of compliance).
170. See Learning to Love Sarbanes-Oxley, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Nov. 21,2005, http://
www.businessweek.commagazine/content/05_47/b3960113.htm (discussing the benefits
companies have experienced as a result of Section 404) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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continue to alleviate cost concerns for small businesses-their major reason for
opposing the regulation -71-as additional facts regarding the true costs and
benefits of compliance become available.
2. Regulation Will Not Destroy the Benefits of Being Public
The other significant argument that the small business community makes
is that without relief from the current Section 404 requirements, smaller
companies will exit the market in mass numbers as the costs of regulation make
raising capital in the public markets inefficient. The argument continues that
the loss of these investment opportunities will harm the investing public more
than requiring small businesses to comply with Section 404 will benefit
investors. However, the proposals set forth by small business would have a
more devastating effect on the capital markets than mandatory compliance.
As discussed in Part IV.A, two significant issues arise from any proposed
relief for small business. First, small businesses would be relegated to a
"second-class" status in the marketplace.1 72 Second, the marketplace would be
thrown into utter confusion over which companies were following which
standards. This confusion would likely lead to the development of new
exchanges or sub-exchanges to handle the companies not fully complying with
Section 404 to ease the confusion on investors.
Currently, the capital marketplace is experiencing a resurgence as a result
of renewed "investor confidence, fueled by the implementation of [the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act] reforms, including those enumerated in Section 404."071
Relief from Section 404 for smaller companies would greatly undermine this
newly found confidence. 74 Requiring small companies to comply with the
regulation of Section 404 would maintain this confidence, while not affecting
the current structure of the capital markets. Under specific guidance from the
SEC, investors would know at what level of compliance a company will be
during the entire three year implementation project. As the implementation
process continues, more investors will be attracted to these smaller companies,
a direct result of the increased transparency and assurances given by Section
404's requirements. As more investors are attracted to these smaller
companies, the influx of available capital will lower the overall costs of raising
171. See DAVERN, supra note 73, at 4 (listing seven perceived flaws with Section 404, six
of which are related to compliance costs).





capital, thereby making the capital markets an attractive source of equity for
smaller companies, even in the face of the increased regulation.
3. Strong Internal Controls Achieve Their Purposes
The final argument that small business makes for relief from Section 404
is that internal controls do not detect and prevent fraud effectively. ' However,
recent evidence shows that financial restatements have increased to record
numbers in 2004.176 This increase in restatements has been primarily attributed
to the "scrutiny placed on... internal controls" leading to the discovery of an
increased number of reporting problems. 177  This evidence confirms that
Sarbanes-Oxley and Section 404 are achieving their goal of increasing investor
confidence through more transparent financial reporting.
78
Further, small business advocates state that internal controls are not
effective in preventing million-dollar frauds. 17 9 However, this argument is very
misleading, as proper internal controls will typically detect fraud before it
reaches the million-dollar mark. 80 If anything, small businesses need internal
controls more than anyone, as a report has shown that the per-employee losses
of small businesses are one-hundred times more costly than the per-employee
losses at large businesses.' 8' This report also suggests that one of the major
factors behind this statistic is a lack of sufficient controls.
8 2
Finally, Section 404 has benefits outside of fraud prevention and investor
confidence. Companies are beginning to realize additional benefits from the
175. See supra Part IV.A (summarizing the small business argument against complying
with Section 404).
176. See Report: Restatements Increased at Record Pace in '04, WEBCPA, Jan. 21,2005,
http:// www.webcpa.com/article.cfin?articleid=10404&print=yes ("[R]estatements... due to
accounting errors rose 28 percent in 2004, to a record 414.") (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
177. Id.
178. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (quoting the purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act).
179. See DAvERN, supra note 73, at 4 (providing information from an Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners report).
180. See Martin T. Biegelman, Designing a Robust Fraud Prevention Program, FRAUD
MAGAZINE, Mar./Apr. 2004, http://www.acfe.com/fraud/view.asp?ArticlelD=244 ("[A] common
denominator of the recent... frauds is that strong internal control systems weren't in place.")
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
181. See Joseph T. Wells, Protect Small Business, J. ACCT., Mar. 2003,
http://www.acfe.corr/ fraud/view.asp?ArticlelD=27 (discussing an Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners' report) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
182. Id.
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implementation of Section 404. These benefits range from significant savings
in a company's operations to improving the orientation process for new
employees.1
8 3
The staggered implementation plan will successfully allow small business
to comply with Section 404 in a manner that will not hinder future growth.
Evidence shows that the costs of compliance have decreased significantly and
are no longer as burdensome as initially feared by small business. Furthermore,
the consequences of partial or non-compliance for small business in the capital
markets can be avoided only by full compliance. Finally, strong internal
controls benefit not only the investor, but also the company. Mandatory
compliance with Section 404 would force small businesses to invest in
themselves, protecting and improving their companies in the process.
V. Conclusion
While the initial response to Section 404 was absolute disgust, time is
showing that this may have been too harsh, a knee-jerk reaction without
understanding all facets of the reforms. The perceived costs of implementation,
while still higher than predicted, have retreated from the levels that small
business had feared. In turn, these lower costs of compliance will significantly
impact the number of companies that will opt to give up or forego their public
status. Although some companies will likely choose to avoid the additional
regulation from Section 404, the loss of these companies is a small price to pay
for the resulting increase in investor confidence. Finally, the unexpected
benefits that have appeared as a result of Section 404 have been significant in
the two years that the regulations have been effective.
The main benefit from staggered implementation is that it requires
companies to absorb the high initial costs over a stretch of time. One lesson
learned from the large companies that have already had to comply with Section
404 is that an extension to comply with Section 404 has been used to merely
delay the implementation of their compliance steps.1 4 Therefore, companies
183. Pitney Bowes, Inc. is expecting to save over $500,000 as a result of a consolidation of
their accounts receivables offices. Learning to Love Sarbanes-Oxley, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE,
Nov. 21, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_47/b3960113.htm (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Another company commented that the
documentation required by Section 404 has provided them with employee manuals that allow
new employees to be introduced to their functions quickly and properly. Id.
184. See Stephen Taub, No Vacation from Section 404 Prep Work, CFO.COM, July 14,
2004, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3015183 (revealing that nearly half of the companies had
not completed sixty percent of their preparations approximately four months before the
compliance year end) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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will recognize little of the unexpected benefits from Section 404 if they receive
a reprieve from compliance for three years without any required interim
progress.
An additional benefit from a three-year implementation is that companies
should begin to realize the unexpected benefits of Section 404 compliance
before they have fully implemented all of the required reforms. The benefits
discussed in this Note were realized by companies one and two years into
compliance. With a three-year compliance time frame, small businesses should
begin to recognize some of these same benefits. This does not suggest that
these companies will recognize the full benefit from compliance before they
have completed implementation, but these benefits should begin to accrue prior
to that time.
Without a doubt, Congress acted hastily in implementing the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. The underlying purpose of this proposal is to ensure that the same
mistake does not occur twice. Section 404 is far from perfect, but if the small
business community exercises patience in confronting these regulations, they
may realize that Section 404 has become a demon of their own creation. By
taking the time to understand all of the implications, both good and bad, of
compliance with Section 404, the small business community will be able to
provide the SEC with specific reforms that should be implemented to ease the
burden on all companies, regardless of size. These specific requests for small
but significant reform to Section 404 will produce more productive relief for
small business than their current demands.
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